**Introduction:**

**Remembering and Forgetting in Democratic South Africa**

Down a gravel road, nearly fifty kilometers east of the nearest town of Dundee, two museums sit on opposite banks of the Ncome River in an otherwise empty field. The museums commemorate the battle of Ncome/Blood River, fought on 16 December 1838 between Afrikaner Voortrekkers and regiments of the Zulu empire. Although strategically peripheral, the battle is part of the bedrock of Afrikaner nationalist history. Largely forgotten until the early 20th century, the battle was recast as the keystone in the mythology of divine election of the Afrikaner people and their place in South Africa, along with the historical reconstruction of the Voortrekkers as a unified, cause-driven population (Crampton 2001; Murray 2013). While the battle looms large in Afrikaner nationalist history, the river—which such accounts say ran red with the blood of slain Zulu warriors[[1]](#footnote-1)—is little more than a muddy stream.

The museums, standing across the river and memorializing different sides of the battle, are themselves curiously martial in posture and architecture. On the west bank of the river stands the Bloedrivier museum, which is home to a set of 64 life-size bronze recreations of the Voortrekker wagons, arranged in a circular formation, or *laager*. This daunting installation is located, according to museum staff, on the very site where the Voortrekkers circled their wagons to fight with Zulu warriors. Emerging victorious, despite being vastly outnumbered, the Voortrekkers are said to have taken this as a sign of their divine election and rightness of place in South Africa. Dedicated in 1947, during the ascendency of the Afrikaner nationalist cause, the Bloedrivier museum commemorates the military victory of the Boers. Private donations make up the majority of the museum’s operating budget.

Directly opposite the *laager*, on the east bank of the river, stands the Ncome River museum. Founded in 1998, this museum commemorates the sacrifice of Zulu warriors who died in the same battle. Funded by the government, the museum seeks to offer a “positive reinterpretation of the 1838 war and Zulu culture in general” (Dubin 2016, 187). The building is shaped as a concave arch, arrayed with *izihlanu* (shields) from each of the regiments of the Zulu kingdom that fought in the battle. The concave shape of the building evokes the “bull horn” (*impondo zenkomo*) formation of the Zulu regiments and stands, according to museum staff, on the site where the Zulu warriors arranged themselves for battle when their calls for parley with the Boers went unanswered. Frozen in concrete, bronze, and collective memory, the two sides still stand, poised for combat.

These museums, sitting just across the river from one another, commemorate two vastly different interpretations of a single battle, each sympathetic to their own group. Each side claims the other was treacherous, and each was acting in self-defense. Each side claims their rightness of place, through divine election of the Afrikaners or through the indigeneity of the Zulus. Both sides, in other words, claim the moral high ground, in victory and defeat. The “mutually annihilating truths” of each institution, to borrow a phrase from Rian Malan (2009),[[2]](#footnote-2) exist alongside of the other.

On the day I visited, local groups were visiting each of the museums. The visitors, children from an Afrikaans-medium primary school at the Bloedrivier museum, and young local artists painting a mural in the Ncome River museum, said that they had known about the museums for a long time. When asked whether they would cross the river and visit the museum on the opposite bank, the artists laughed, and the children’s teachers asked why they should. Both the teachers and the artists could see the museum other bank of the river, but could not imagine viewing the battle from the other side. Even now, nearly 180 years after the battle, visitors are choosing sides.

Public figures, like President Jacob Zuma, have said that the coexistence of the museums is evidence of the power of the newly democratic South Africa to bring together formerly warring factions and build a rainbow nation that represents the interests of all citizens (Dzanibe 2014). But is this parallel existence of discrete interpretations of history indicative of the emergence of a newly unified nation? While there is a kind of balance in telling the story of both sides of the battle, it is a balance of peaceful coexistence of discrete groups (Girshick 2004, 34), rather than a meaningful integration of narratives, or space, or history, or people.

To address these contradictions, the South African government dedicated funds to open a bridge connecting the two sites. In 2013, President Jacob Zuma presided over the commemoration of the bridge at the Ncome River Museum in a ceremony marking the 175th anniversary of the battle. The bridge was intended to literally and figuratively connect the two museums, and provide a path to reconciliation. The sign explaining the bridge proclaims that it “was constructed to symbolize the removal of racial and social barriers by connecting two institutions built on one battle field, narrating the same story…from two different perspectives. This bridge moves beyond linking these two institutions to connect and unite citizens through shared history, heritage and values towards unity in diversity and nation building.”

The reconciliation bridge, however, was a source of conflict from its inception (Coan 2013). At the commemoration of the sign quoted above, state dignitaries standing at the Ncome River museum campus were greeted with apartheid-era flags flown in protest at the Bloedrivier museum campus (Dzanibe 2014). The sign itself, situated on the Ncome River Museum grounds, is decorated with the same Zulu shields that adorn the museum building. Like the museum that houses it, the sign signals its allegiance in design, location and content. The protests against the bridge signaled their own partisan leanings, evoking symbols of Afrikaner power, like the old regime’s flag and the apartheid anthem. The bridge, while physically linking the two banks of the river, has not spanned the metaphorical distance between the two institutions and their constituencies.

Yet, most remarkable of all, the bridge itself is literally inaccessible. It is gated and locked. The Ncome River Museum staff hold the keys. The Bloedrivier museum site is surrounded by razor wire, which prevents visitors from approaching the bridge at all. While the reconciliation bridge exists, it is not possible for most visitors to actually traverse the distance between the two museums. Those metaphorical barriers which led the school teachers and the artists to dismiss my question about visiting the other museum are recreated in physical form on the bridge which was supposed to overcome them.

The reasons behind the closure of the bridge are somewhat unclear. There have been some reports of vandalism, as well as security-based objections to “uncontrolled access” to the museum campuses (Coan 2013). Representatives from each of the museums have also cited the lack of funds for maintenance and security as a major barrier to the bridge’s use (Department of Arts and Culture: Republic of South Africa 2016). Similar efforts to bridge disparate institutions have come to the same ends. The “reconciliation road” linking Freedom Park (a post-apartheid monument to the anti-apartheid struggle) and the Vootrekker Monument (an apartheid-era memorial commemorating the Voortrekers) outside of Pretoria was closed indefinitely in 2015, due to budgetary and security concerns (Alfred 2015).[[3]](#footnote-3) But a blocked bridge and a closed road are not, in themselves, noteworthy.

The bridge and the road, however, are not simply infrastructural connections. They were constructed to be symbolically resonant. Their existence was meant to indicate the possibilities of the new, democratic order to create connections that could not have existed under the old regime. While the building of new institutions, like Freedom Park and the Ncome River Museum, was a critical part of the redress of past injustices, the symbolic and literal bridge-building was, in many ways, the central feature of the transition. These bridges, whether the literal, concrete ones, or the symbolic ones—like the new multi-lingual, multi-melody national anthem, the 1995 Rugby World Cup or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission—were meant to reconfigure what it meant to be South African. Leaders of the transition, from Nelson Mandela to F.W. De Klerk and Desmond Tutu called these efforts reconciliation. The hallmark of the negotiated transition was not only the justice of majoritarian democracy, but the institutionalized attempts to remap the social and political sphere to overcome the divisions made and sustained by previous regimes.

At their core, such efforts were attempts at nation building; attempts to create a community of sentiment which meaningfully mirrored the new multi-racial community of free and equal citizens. While representation of previously disenfranchised people was key to making the new democracy meaningfully multi-racial, the attempts to connect previously separated communities were central to the very idea of building a new South Africa. The transition did not just mean that a new museum would be built,[[4]](#footnote-4) but that it would be connected to the extant museum, telling both sides of the battle and encouraging the conversation.

The closure of this bridge is, then, a kind of allegory of South Africa more than two decades after the transition from apartheid to democracy. While the implementation of institutionalized democracy has been largely successful—characterized by a strong and independent judiciary; free, fair and regular elections; and protections of civil rights and liberties—there are signs that the nation-building aspirations of the transition have become tarnished. These divergent fates are, in part, because the two projects—establishing democratic institutions and nation building—are distinct and sometimes have opposing incentives. Nation-building imperatives compel citizens to focus on what makes them similar and what binds them together, forgetting what makes them different. In other words, nation-building asks citizens to look at their bridges, and then forget that the river ever separated them in the first place. Democratic institution building, on the other hand, requires fostering opposition through conducting multi-party elections and encouraging debate. Leaders of democratic factions, like parties or interest groups, can consolidate their power by emphasizing difference. The conduct of elections, then, may incentivize leaders to remind citizens to look at the museums, and turn away from the bridge.

But when held in tension, these two impulses—toward remembering difference and forgetting it, between focusing on unity and encouraging division—are mutually constitutive of sustainable democracy. Both are necessary for building sustainable peace after periods of conflict. Democracies fundamentally require sentiments of unity to be sustainable. Such sentiments underpin peaceful transitions of power, allowing toleration of dissent, electoral losses and protections of minority rights (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Unchecked nationalism is almost inevitably undemocratic in practice, veering into xenophobia and violent exclusion. Without a community of sentiment, a democracy is profoundly volatile. Without democratic debate and institutionalized checks on power, national unity often devolves into tyranny. Holding these forces of unity and division in balance is the key to creating and sustaining peace in post-conflict situations.

The project of post-conflict peacebuilding often pairs these two imperatives because of their potential synergies, especially in the case of negotiated transitions (Beall, Gelb, and Hassim 2005; Linz and Stepan 2011). In such situations, newly constituted (or re-constituted) central authorities undertake the process of framing a new government and using various initiatives from redistribution to truth commissions to redress the histories of conflict. The state, in other words, is tasked with building a nation.

This is a peculiarly modern scenario, in which central authorities attempt to build a community of sentiment which resembles the community of citizens out of groups of former combatants. Such an arrangement stands in opposition to the ways in which many theorists of nationalism understand the emergence of national communities. Canonical theorists of nationalism from Renan through Anderson, Gellner, and Hale have assumed that the nation chronologically, or at least sentimentally, precedes the creation of the state. This arrangement is the basis on which the defining characteristic of national groups, self-determination, is legible. A nation, as a defined group of people united by shared traits and the “belief in the right to territorial self-determination,” (Barrington 1997, 713), must make the demand for the creation of an authority which governs them.[[5]](#footnote-5) The particular challenge in post-conflict scenarios, then, is to try to leverage newly imposed authority to create a community that legitimizes that self-same authority.

This unity, however, is not necessarily an all-encompassing form of identity that displaces all others. Many multi-ethnic or multi-racial states do not necessarily create national identities that supplant or supersede other sectarian affiliations, like religion, caste, ethnicity, or race. These “state-nations” can protect and value multiple, complementary forms of identity (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). However, even in these cases there is still enormous political value in states fostering the creation of a community, based on a sense of belonging, that “engender[s] strong identification and loyalty from their citizens” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 27, see also Linz and Stepan 2011). In such situations, it is not about necessarily forgetting difference, but de-emphasizing the metaphorical rivers and keeping the bridge open.

The South African transition from apartheid to democracy presents a fascinating case of both the creation of democratic state institutions as well as conscious efforts at nation building in the wake of violence and repression (Shoup and Holmes 2013). As part of the transition process, the Interim Constitution established a multi-party government called the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU itself was meant to bring all major political parties into government, and to promote “reconciliation” and “national healing.” As such, the GNU was tasked with creating a newly united national community under their own leadership (Wilson 2001). These strategies of community building and self-legitimation were also paired with party-based considerations. Such pressures ultimately led representatives from the National Party, the erstwhile architects of apartheid, to leave the GNU for status as an opposition party.

Yet despite dire predictions of civil war before and during the transition (Horowitz 1991), the advent of multi-racial democracy in South Africa was largely peaceful.[[6]](#footnote-6) The elections in 1994 were hailed as a “political miracle” (Lewis 1994), in part because of the ways that former adversaries had committed to work together not only to build democratic institutions but to try and create a new community. This transition has become a model for similar transitions from repressive rule to fully-fledged democracy in other post-conflict societies (Mamdani 2015; Graybill 2002; Adler and Webster 1995).

Yet the optimism of the transitional period faded rather quickly. The promise of a newly formulated “rainbow nation” which brought together previously divided communities in a newly reconciled society had dimmed by the turn of the century. Despite the nation-building aspirations of the transition, Zapiro, a prominent South African political cartoonist published a piece entitled “The Black and White Nation” in 2000 (Fig. 1).



Figure 1 - The Black and White Nation, Zapiro 2000

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The cartoon, which plays on South Africa’s “rainbow nation” moniker, shows an older man speaking to a boy, looking at a rainbow which is made up of only two stripes: one black, and one white. The multi-colored rainbow of the transition, the old man implies, was “just a temporary illusion.” The rainbow nation, as a metaphor for, and symbol of, the new multi-racial dispensation in South Africa signaled hope and change, whereas the black and white rainbow shows the speaker (and potentially the artist and his audience) to be resigned to and disillusioned by the continued primacy of race as a governing logic, even after the official systems of apartheid had been dismantled.

The persistence of race as the “common sense” of social identity in South Africa (Posel 2001; Maré 2005; Sallaz 2010) is evident in myriad social contexts. Racial labels and attributions continue to be the source of conflict in schools (Dolby 2001; Teeger 2015; Mangcu 2017), in the delivery of public goods (Patel 2016; McClendon 2016), within and between political parties (Ferree 2010), in the renaming of public spaces (Duminy 2014), and in the management of public monuments (Marschall 2004; Coombes 2005; Holmes and Loehwing 2016). The experience of transitional justice, in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in some cases, seems to even have strengthened the salience of sectarian racial and ethnic identities (Gibson 2004).

While political science research does not often have to explain continuity, in the case of the celebrated (and emulated) South African transition, it is remarkable. The transition was laudable because it was supposed to be a break with the past. Yet, the troublesome divisions created and sustained by the prior regime still divide post-apartheid, democratic society. Marxisant scholars like Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass have argued that it is the persistence and growth of economic inequality, which coincides to a startling degree with the racial categories established by the old regime, that explains the endurance of identity from the old regime to the new (Seekings and Nattrass 2008; Seekings 2008; Nattrass and Seekings 2001). Economic grievances have inspired social movements aimed at demanding redistribution of goods and delivery of services like reliable electricity, formal housing and piped water (Ballard et al. 2005; Zuern 2011). While the lack of economic transformation in South Africa since apartheid can certainly account for some of the persistence of racialized social cleavages, social and political processes re-create and sustain the divisions created by the colonial and apartheid governments.

Non-class-based senses of self, place, alienation, and belonging play a critical role in supporting and also undermining the project of South African nation- and democracy-building. Aside from the pressing material dimensions of social division in South Africa, there are also social and political dynamics associated with both the functioning of democracy and the practices of community-building, highlighted by the data presented in this manuscript, that inform the ways that South Africans think of the fractures within their national communities. Like material inequality, which has its roots in the apartheid era but has been exacerbated after 1994, the social and political divisions which lead South Africans to see the “Black and White Rainbow” are partially the product of the past, but are also meaningfully re-created by individual and collective choices made in the post-apartheid era.

These divisions, and the processes that make them vibrant and quotidian even in the absence of state-sponsored segregation, highlight the tensions between building a democracy and the building a nation. While the political transition from apartheid to multi-racial democracy involved unprecedented efforts to build a national community, the divides of the past have proven resilient, in part because of the ways that democratic systems have calcified around these same divisions.

Nation-Building and Democracy: Memory and Forgetting

Nations, as communities of sentiment, are built through emphasizing similarities and understating difference. Whether those are the stable, innate similarities of primoridalist thinkers,[[7]](#footnote-7) or differences between communities emphasized by elites for political ends as in the instrumentalist school, or long term social and political processes emphasized by constructivists, the idea of nationhood is fundamentally about emphasizing what ties a community together and sidelining or sublimating internal diversity. The creation of a national community, whether of a nation-state or a state-nation, is premised on a collective, and selective, forgetting.

Stemming from the writings of Ernest Renan, who asserted that forgetting was “a crucial element in the creation of nations” (1882, 11), Michael Billig argues:

Every nation must have its history, its own collective memory. This remembering is simultaneously a collective forgetting: the nation, which celebrates it antiquity, forgets its historical recency…once a nation is established, it depends for its continued existence upon a collective amnesia…Not only is the past forgotten, as it is ostensibly being recalled, but so there is a parallel forgetting of the present (Billig 1995, 37–38).

Whether it is forgetting local dialects, in Anderson’s Imagined Communities (2006), or remembering the patriotic “stories of peoplehood” for Rogers Smith (2003), nationalism is premised on selective histories and disregarding difference. Even in the primoridalist school, the construction of “Ethno-history,” which “harks back to one or more ‘golden age,’” is a critical feature of the transition from pre-political *ethnie* to nation, as “…these ages have become canonical; they epitomize all that is great and noble in ‘our community’, now so sadly missing, but soon to be restored with the nation’s rebirth” (A. D. Smith 2010, 151–52).

By contrast, Gellner (2008) calls this process “social entropy,” wherein information is selectively lost in the process of modernization and nation-building through the industrial age. By forgetting their differences, people in newly formed and forming urban classes, drawn from different places, can peacefully associate and form communities. The loss of information with the passage of time and policy interventions aimed at creating a new class of citizen is crucially important to underpin nationalist sentiments (Weber 1976). Whether it is the loss of information through building history of heroes, as in Smith or Renan, or through economic transformation as for Gellner, the loss of information is critical in the process of national coherence.

 Theorists of nationalism disagree on how this loss of information comes about. Under what conditions are differences forgotten, and to whom the duty of emphasizing similarity attributed? In some accounts, it is the conscious propagation of a version of history consonant with leaders’ goals (e.g. R. M. Smith 2003) or a heroic sense of past (e.g. Renan 1882) which grounds the national community. For others, state-sponsored activities, like the proliferation of banal symbolism (e.g. Billig 1995), or the drawing of strong borders (Laremont 2005; Kedourie 1993) help to differentiate nations. Some theorists, by contrast, understand the loss of information to be the inevitable outcome of long-term social processes like industrialization, economic development, and urbanization (Gellner 2008; Robinson 2014), or the codification of language and its relationship to power (Anderson 2006). The common thread, however, is that nations and nationalism are dependent on a community of sentiment whose construction, and constituent parts, must obscure the fact of themselves. This is because, as Suny points out, “Identities might in fact be fluid, but in the real world of politics the players act as if they are immutable, both for strategic reasons and emotional satisfaction” (Suny 2004, 7). The emotional draw of nationalism is in the naturalness of the community that it constructs, a community based on the forgetting of internal diversity.

There are two complementary sides of this forgetting: the writing of consonant national history of the unifying events of the community, and the selective erasure of those things that have divided the community. The creation of national communities has been premised on strategic ignoring of the past in large celebrations in Gabon (Fricke 2013) and Ethiopia (Orlowska 2013), as well as in former Soviet states (Cohen 1999). In these cases, leaders commemorate, or attempt to create, a community with relatively shallow references to history. Other empirical cases demonstrate the importance of the writing of authoritative nationalist history to help ground the community in a narrative of their own inevitability. This narrative can involve nationalist symbols, like the flag in India (Roy 2006), public celebrations and school curricula as in Eastern Europe (Esbenshade 1995), or diplomatic and international relations (He 2007). In all these cases, after a significant conflict, the goal of establishing nationalist history and myth is to ground the community in whatever history can serve to unify it. Often, this has meant ignoring contentious aspects of prior conflicts, papering over social divisions or raising a set of historical figures to national prominence. The precondition for such myth-making is the selective erasure of the contentious past.

However, newly emerging democratic systems, like South Africa in the mid-1990’s, prevent at least some of the information loss that is involved in writing nationalist history. As parties arise, they seek to consolidate their voter bases by drawing on extant social cleavages (Chandra 2007; Zielinski 2002). In drawing on these cleavages, parties consolidate their voting bases, and reinforce divides in society, both directly and indirectly (Ferree 2010). Many of those pieces of social information, which Gellner says are inimical to the emergence of nationalism, are preserved and made important through the processes of democratic contestation. While the emergence of nationalism requires selective forgetting, it is often advantageous for individuals and political parties to remind constituents of salient political divides to distinguish themselves from their opposition and build support (Reilly 2006).

In short, while the building of nationalist history asks community members to forget their differences, democratic functioning seems to incentivize the remembering and recreating of division. It is not that democratic contestation is inimical to the formation of nationalist sentiments. Rather, this book argues that deeply divided communities, whose divisions are mutually reinforcing and codified in a political party system, have difficulty in forming new modes of association among citizens that mitigate inherited divides. The iterative competition between factions in the form of democratic contestation of elections therefore, can have the effect of recreating those same divides and impeding the creation of nationalist sentiments.

 Although social divides between citizens are inevitable in large democratic systems, the sustainability of democratic political contestation relies on the presence of divides that allow people to cohere with others in a variety of different ways. Cross-cutting cleavages are centrally important in creating stability in ethnically, linguistically or religiously divided societies (Dunning and Harrison 2010; Gubler and Selway 2012). The process of nation-building is intimately connected with the formation of cross-cutting cleavages, insofar as they promote identities that undermine the salience of conflict-era divisions (Hayner 2002, 161; Verdeja 2009, 3). These networks of intersecting social divisions allow for citizens to be active and politically engaged without the group identities that they possess threatening the political system. If social divides coincide with one another, they become more profound. When these mutually reinforcing cleavages are represented in the form of political parties, the social divides they represent are consistently recreated (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003). In the wake of political violence, the drawing out of social cleavages that cut across, rather than reinforce, the identities associated with the past struggle allows for robust political contestation to occur sustainably (Goodin 1975; Simonsen 2005).

Creating and sustaining meaningful modes of democratic contestation within young democracies is a vital part of the process of consolidation. As is explained in detail in chapter 8, the mechanisms of institutionalized opposition in South Africa, particularly political parties and opposition groups, are linked closely with racialized labels and racial identities. Although it is not necessarily true that voters’ preference for parties is linked directly with individuals’ racial identity, the racialized labels of the various parties contesting elections is central to the ways in which individuals choose the parties they support (Ferree 2010; McLaughlin 2007). As early as the second democratic elections in 1999, South African scholars were calling for a newly conceptualized mode and vocabulary of opposition which could help distance the country from the racialized divides of the past, which would also strengthen the hand of the opposition and provide a greater challenge to the ANC (see, e.g. Habib and Taylor 1999), but which later scholars have argued is largely absent (Maré 2005; Habib and Herzenberg 2011).

Despite the massive effort to promote interracial reconciliation and to form a single, inclusive South African identity, “the available evidence suggests that the “new South African” remains a decidedly incomplete democratic animal” (Mattes 2011, 93). Clear majorities of the South African population expressed the desire to suppress the political expressions of their ethno-political opponents, even those within the mainstream of the political spectrum (Gibson and Gouws 2003, 56–61). Surveys also indicate that a significant minority of South African support “the idea of apartheid” as a system of social segregation, even if they oppose the way the ideology was implemented under the old regime (Gibson 2004, 79).[[8]](#footnote-8)

This book undertakes a thematic exploration of the ways in which the social divides of the past, specifically those of race, are being re-inscribed in democratic South Africa, as well as the attempts to bridge those divides. Each of the chapters, discussed in detail below, examines a facet of nationalist and democratic life, like the integration of public space or the development of a national symbolic repertoire, to understand the ways in which the post-apartheid, democratic order is shaped by reminders and reinscriptions of the past versus those efforts toward unity and redrawing of social relations.

In examining these questions of memory and forgetting, some scholars of South African democracy have focused on the transformation (or its lack) in museums and monuments (see, e.g. Murray 2013; Marschall 2004; Coombes 2005). Such works examine the authoritative public choices on the management of public space and collective memory, and in some cases, citizen responses to them. This book, by contrast, seeks to examine the ways that individual citizens, as well as subnational groups, construct their senses of place and identity within the democratic state.

Because nation-building is a multi-faceted enterprise, this book takes a thematic approach in each chapter to try and understand the complexity of the lived experience of social relations in South Africa. The themes are drawn both from scholarly work on nationalism and democracy as well as from interview participants’ accounts and fieldwork, as discussed below. Each thematic exploration is an attempt to grapple with the complex forces that shape the politically relevant “we-groups” that constitute either the complementary network of multiple identities which make up modern South Africa, or that challenge the formation of broader senses of community.

Research Design and Methodology

 This book is underpinned by data collected and created during fieldwork that I conducted from June 2012 through May 2013. The data, from interviews, participant observation, newspapers and other documents, was assembled primarily in the cities of Bloemfontein (from June-December 2012) and Durban (from January-May 2013), with trips to Pretoria, Eshowe, Dundee, Utrect, Ulundi, Centurion, and Johannesburg for participant observation, specialist interviews, and notable events. While in Bloemfontein, I was affiliated with the University of the Free State, Department of Political Studies and Governance, within the Faculty of the Humanities. I received funding in support of this research from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Institute for International Education. The collected data fall broadly into three categories: interview transcripts, ethnographic observation, and collected documents. The data were collected among two populations defined linguistically: Afrikaans and isiZulu speakers.

*Case Selection – South Africa*

 The South African case, regarding the issues of democratic consolidation and nation building looms large, in part because of its prominence in the literature on transitional justice and post-conflict transitions away from authoritarian regimes. However, much of the literature on the South African transition from apartheid to multi-racial democracy discusses the negotiations, the execution of the process of transitional justice, and the first round of inclusive elections in 1994. By limiting the timeframe of the analysis in this way, scholars, decision-makers and popular audiences are “are overwhelmingly enamored with the “miracle” of South Africa and the TRC’s perceived role as midwife to that miracle. Many countries consider the TRC to be a model for how to facilitate transition from authoritarian rule to democracy” (Cole 2009, 124). This level of fame has led to a debate in the scholarly literature on the South African transition about whether the process of transitional justice, and the trandition away from apartheid more generally can be seen as a “miracle” or a “model,” with some scholars arguing that it was, in fact, both (Graybill 2002; Shore 2009). If, indeed, these are the only two options then the process of nation-building and democratic consolidation in South Africa can be considered a *fait accompli*. But, there are reasons to believe that the nation-building project has stalled, in no small part because of both the continuities with the apartheid regime that are evident after 20 years of democracy, and the ways that those social divides are being recreated through contemporary social and political practices.

In addition to its prominence as a case, South Africa is currently undergoing a massive demographic shift that makes evaluating the process of democratic consolidation and nation building even more pressing. In the 2014 (national) and 2016 (municipal) elections in South Africa, voters that were born just before or after the end of apartheid were the single largest potential cohort in the electorate. The so-called “born free” generation, those that have no memories of the apartheid system and who have come of age under an ANC-led democratic government were eligible to vote in large numbers in 2014, although they had relatively low voter turnout compared to other age cohorts (Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa 2014). But, interestingly, despite not having apartheid as a reference point, the born-free generation is not significantly more racially tolerant (and in some samples is less tolerant) and is markedly less committed to democracy than older age cohorts (Lefko-Everett 2012; Mattes 2012). This apparent inheritance of intolerance, and distrust of democratic functioning seems to indicate that the simple passage of time will not produce a more tolerant, democratic, or inclusive South Africa, and indicative of the continuing and reinscribed salience of the divides associated with race and ethnicity.

*Case Selection – Afrikaans-speakers and Zulu-speakers*

 Both of the groups with whom interviews were conducted have historically grounded claims to belonging to the country and the land. The Afrikaners are a ‘sociologically indigenous’ deep-settler population who severed their ties to Europe centuries ago, and created an identity around *hiervandaan* or being *from here* (Stone 1986). Afrikaner group identity, which from the 1940’s to the early 1990’s was closely bound with the National Party, reached a point of crisis during the period of transition away from apartheid. Memoirs from and about that time from noted Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, like Antjie Krog (2000), Breyten Breytenbach (1993) Rian Malan (1990) and At Van Wyk (1991), are filled with reflexive examination of self and place, attempts to process the information that was surfacing about the horrors of apartheid and the guilt associated with what had been done in the name of this group of people.

 By contrast, Zulu *izibongo* (families or clans) have claims to indigeneity that go back a thousand years, having arrived in Southern Africa sometime around the 9th century, although their formation as a more or less cohesive nation dates only to the early 1800’s (Hamilton 1998). Some scholars have argued that, as a politically salient identity, *ubuZulu* only emerged in the early 20th century in response to government policies defining so-called “native reserves” (Wright 2009). During the time of transition, the IFP-organized paramilitary forces and engaged in a paramilitary ground war in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. This apparent surge of violent nationalism dissipated quickly after the first democratic elections, the IFP has shrunk as a politically salient force, and since the transition away from apartheid in the mid-1990’s, many public manifestations of Zuluness that were associated with the transitional period have faded (Carton 2009). Yet some scholars have observed a newer manifestation of Zulu nationalism emerging that is disconnected with the ethnic entrepreneurs of the transition period and closely aligned with the ANC, and its Zulu president, Jacob Zuma (Ndletyana and Maaba 2010).

*Bloemfontein and Durban as Research Sites*

 The two cities in which this research was primarily conducted were Bloemfontein and Durban. Each of these cities, demographically, historically and in terms of public culture, were well-suited to target the ethnolinguistic populations that this project concerns, as well as providing scholarly resources to aid in the production of this research. Each city is home to monuments significant to the sub-populations I was seeking to study, as well as having significant media outlets—television, radio and newspapers—in the target languages and sports teams.

 Bloemfontein, the capital city of the Free State province, is the 8th largest city in South Africa. Called one of the “firmest bastions of Afrikaner power under apartheid,” (Verwey and Quayle 2012, 557), it has a reputation for being relatively conservative in the post-apartheid period. Serving as the home of the judicial capital of South Africa, Bloemfontein also houses several museums, like the National Museum. Additionally, the city is home to the National Women’s Monument, discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 5, which is a significant artifact of the Afrikaner nationalist period. First-language Afrikaans-speakers are a plurality in the city of Bloemfontein, with 42.53% of the population. The city is also historically important, as the place where both the South African Natives National Congress (later the ANC) and the National Party were founded, in 1912 and 1915 respectively.

 Durban is South Africa’s 3rd largest city, and home to the largest concentration of Zulu-speakers in the country, who make up a plurality of the city population, about 33%. The capital of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban also houses significant museums, like the KwaMuhle Museum. The city itself is closely identified with Zulu culture, especially since the end of the apartheid era, and is also home to the offices of several political parties, like the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

 Both of these sites were supplemented by observation and interviews conducted in a variety of other locales, urban and rural, in order to address the shortcomings of their situation. However, each of these cities, while providing access to key populations as well as public spaces for observation, also presents limitations for the present study.

The most obvious limitation is that the racial makeup of the sub-populations under study was, in important ways, set by the contexts in which interviews were conducted. The South African government categorizes the vast majority of Zulu-speakers as black African, regardless of where they reside, and this is certainly true in Durban. The Afrikaans-speaking population in South Africa is more diverse, and geographically dispersed. While the vast majority of the people with whom I spoke in Bloemfontein would be classified as white (though many declined to adopt that moniker themselves when discussing identity politics), non-White Afrikaans-speakers are the demographic majority of the linguistically defined population. Geographically concentrated in the Cape Region, so-called “Coloureds” (historically mixed-race or Creole populations) make up the slight majority of first-language Afrikaans-speakers.

However, for both practical[[9]](#footnote-9) and theoretical reasons, situating my research outside of *Die Kolonie—*a somewhat unflattering moniker for the Cape Region often used by Afrikaans-speakers in the Free State and other Northeastern regions of the country—was advantageous. Firstly, I could target the populations of Afrikaans-speakers who were themselves the potential constituents of some of the most strident attempts to derail the transition process of 1994. Secondly, Afrikaans-speakers support a wider variety of political parties outside of the Cape region, which helps to inform the variety of political stances reflected in this research. Third, while somewhat unrepresentative of the Afrikaans-speaking population as a whole, the Afrikaans-speaking population of Bloemfontein is demographically similar to the Afrikaans-speaking population in the non-Cape regions of the country (Statistics South Africa 2012). Fourth, because primary or home language is relatively less subjective, and certainly less controversial, than race as a label, recruitment of participants was somewhat easier, as well as being less difficult to define. Lastly, by identifying language as the defining feature of the populations under study, even if race was an influencing factor, it allowed the issue of race to come up in organic ways during the course of interview conversations.

*Interview Methodology*

 Interviews with South African citizens of voting age formed a key part of the data that underpin this book. Interview participants were recruited for interviews through written correspondence, or occasionally over the phone after formal, written invitations had been issued using IRB-approved invitation language. Throughout the course of 12-months of fieldwork, 109 individuals volunteered to sit for individual or group interviews that ranged in duration between 45 minutes and nearly 7 hours. The average interview lasted about 90 minutes. Interview participants ranged in age from 19 to 86, and were nearly balanced between men (54 percent) and women (46 percent). Interview participants were eligible for participation if they were South African citizens, over the age of 18, and primarily spoke either Afrikaans or isiZulu at home, and/or considered the language their primary or first language. Interviews are identified in the text with a 3-digit code in the text, which can be cross-referenced with the interview index in the appendix, which includes demographic and voting information for each participant.

 Interview participants were recruited primarily through snowball sampling, with an emphasis on making the sample demographically representative of the target population in terms of age and gender. The sample was tabulated against the 2011 census along those two major dimensions, and corrections were made accordingly. Additional recruitment took place through the hanging of flyers in public places, like university campuses and grocery stores. No compensation was given for participation. There is a slight under-sampling of both populations in the over 60-year-old age category because of difficulties in recruitment, as well as no representation in the under-18 category for ethical reasons.

A central limitation to the interview methodology was likely imposed by the effects of perceived shared racial identity with Afrikaans speakers, versus its absence with Zulu-speakers. Because I present to the world as a white woman, there were likely familiarity effects within the Afrikaans community, which, as stated above was almost exclusively white. Such effects, which research suggests may prompt different responses (see, e.g. Adida et al. 2016) are difficult to counteract in the context of a single interviewer. However, where appropriate, I tried to mitigate such effects through other kinds of signaling, like relying on snowball sampling, using culturally respectful Zulu honorifics to older participants, speaking Zulu with the greatest degree of fluency I had at my command (after 7+ years of study), and inhabiting spaces in which I was introduced by familiar community figures. While not an exhaustive list, and certainly not completely mitigative of the effects of shared racial identity, I believe that these interventions did help to overcome some of the barriers with Zulu speaking interview participants.

 All interviews were conducted via in-person interactions, in which individuals were given consent briefings and asked to fill in identification sheets with basic demographic information, including their age, employment status, home language and whether they had voted in the last national and municipal elections. The interviews were notated by the author and transcribed soon thereafter to maintain the maximum degree of clarity and accuracy of the accounts provided. In general, interviews were structured around standard questions supplemented by follow up questions or clarifications when the author deemed it necessary or interesting.

*Ethnographic Methods*

A second methodological arm of this project was attending of cultural and political events in the places where I was living, as well as writing field notes on ordinary daily occurrences. These notes are supplemented by photography of the spaces and events that I visited. These observations and photos are scattered throughout the various empirical chapters.

 The special events that I attended included the Vryfees music festival in Bloemfontein, which lasted from 10 through 15 July 2012, the Day of the Vow service in Pretoria on 16 December 2012, an ANC centenary rally in Durban on 8 January 2013, the Reed Dance in Ulundi on 1 September 2012 and a variety of church services in both Bloemfontein and Durban. In addition, I went to various museums, like the *Erfenissentrum*/Heritage Center at the Voortrekker monument in Pretoria, the Talana Museum and the battlefield memorials at Blood River/Ncome, Isandlwana, Rourke’s Drift and Spionkop. I also wrote extensive ethnographic notes on various shopping centers in and around Bloemfontein, Pretoria and Durban, as shopping centers have proven to be an important aspect of semi-public but also securitized space in the post-apartheid landscape. Ultimately, only a fraction of these notes became part of the text of this book. Yet these notes provided important pieces of ambient information that undergirds this analysis.

*Other Methods Employed*

 Other significant data were collected from printed materials. The first collection, mostly used for evidence in Chapter 7, was the compilation of newspaper articles from the primary non-English language newspapers in Bloemfontein—*Die Volksblad* in Afrikaans—and Durban—*iSolezwe* in isiZulu. Nearly every day, before any interviews were possible, I would purchase a copy of the newspaper in Afrikaans in Bloemfontein and in isiZulu in Durban, and read through the front-page news and any additional political coverage, in addition to reviewing the English-language news. This practice contextualized the comments of some interview participants, and prevented me, as the interviewer, from missing some of the references made by interview participants. For the analysis presented in Chapter 7, newspaper articles were compared and supplemented by sources from news sources in other cities, like Cape Town and Pretoria, via online archive.

 The other print materials collected included brochures from museums, political party paraphernalia, church bulletins, maps, play bills and magazines. For the most part, this collection of materials was not used directly in supporting this research, but rather gave context to the interpretation of interview quotes and gave background to both references from interviews.

Structure of the Book

 Each chapter adopts a theme and a central research question aimed at addressing a different aspect of national or group identity in South Africa. The chapters concentrate on both factors that remind South Africans of their social divisions and those that point to a unified nation that have been created and sustained in the post-apartheid period. Although interconnected, the chapters draw evidence from different sections of the interview questionnaire, distinct collections of documents, or discrete episodes of ethnographic observation. The themes of the chapters were developed through a grounded theoretical approach. While scholarly explorations of nationalism, as discussed above and in the introductions of the individual chapters, informed the questionnaire and the interpretation of the evidence, the thematic collection of the chapters emerged from manual qualitative coding of the interview transcripts and other evidence after the conclusion of the fieldwork. This combined grounded and scholarly theorizing of identity-based issues positions this work to make contributions to scholarly discussions of nationalism and democratization, as well as to avoid overdetermining elements of identity that were important to participants. Each of the themes in the chapters is discussed in terms of both the scholarly understanding of its contributions to nation-building and democratization, as well as how and why participants discuss the theme in their own words.

Chapter Two is an analysis of the historical trajectory of identity politics in South Africa. By examining the ways in which group identities have been constructed, and some of the political ends that they have served, this chapter seeks to ground later chapters. This chapter argues that the landscape of identity politics in South Africa pre-dates the existence of “South Africa” as a category. The sub-title of the chapter “The Evolution of an Idea” emphasizes the ways in which South Africa, as a point of national imagination, has evolved from one predicated on the notion of exclusion based on race to one in which, at least nominally, all citizens belong.

 By shifting the understanding of racial politics from the deterministic, almost biological, language that is employed in so many interview quotes later on, this chapter seeks to frame the readers’ understanding of identity as a constructed and malleable phenomenon in South Africa. As such, it posits that the point of national identification, of being “South African,” has indeed served as a reference point historically, but a contested one. The opening of the chapter argues that indeed, for decades, there have been governmental exhortations seeking to make the category of “South African” a meaningful one. Yet the category, as with many other points of identification, contends with other identities that have been built and sustained through conflict, expansion, struggle, and material circumstances. This chapter traces the evolution of the ethno-lingustic cleavages, and the attempts to overcome them, in South African history.

 Proceeding out of the discussion over history, Chapter Three discusses the ways that the political transition utilized history to create a newly united South Africa. Contrasting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC], and one of the key symbols associated with the project of reconciliation, the idea of South Africa as the Rainbow Nation, the chapter argues that both ahistorical and historically reconstructive symbols—associated with remembering and forgetting—were utilized as techniques of nation building during the transition. The chapter draws extensively from interview data, specifically questions about participants’ recollections about and evaluations of the TRC, as well as their connections to the “rainbow” symbol.

 Because nation building took the form of both historical erasure, as with the Rainbow symbolism, and historical reconstruction, as with the TRC, many interview participants felt ambivalent about the ways in which the transition figured within their own understanding of their history. What emerged from interview evidence was a divided picture, one in which South African nation building could either be pursued by “moving on” or by “not forgetting,” the former largely advocated by Afrikaans-speakers, and the later by Zulu-speakers. This division, then, is a product of the transition but coincides with other politically and socially meaningful cleavages.

 Chapter Four deals with nation building as a project that is visceral and intimate, played out by embodied and threatened individuals. As such, this chapter asks the question of how threat perception, and the ways in which it is conditioned by race and gender, serves to remind people of social divisions. The chapter proceeds from interview-based evidence about the ways that race and gender interact in the project of nation building now, and how bodily discomfort and threat are understood as barriers to nation building. There are interlocking, but also distinct, solidarities and notions of threat associated with raced and gendered identities. By using ethnographic data, the chapter attempts to understand the ways in which identities are enacted outside of the constructed space of the interview. The final empirical section of the chapter recounts a rather difficult encounter I had after concluding an interview. In so doing, the chapter draws attention to the ways in which the raced and gendered orders of apartheid and colonialism are being recreated in the present democratic era.

 Chapter Five examines the ceremony and performance of group and national identities. These ceremonies are examined in the context of three categories: exclusive, nominally inclusive and truly inclusive. The first category, which takes as case studies the Day of the Vow celebration in Pretoria and the Reed Dance in Ulundi, are those ceremonies whose audience and participant pool are defined through a strict definition of ethnic identity. Such ceremonies have remained resilient, and grown, in the context of a democratic South Africa. The most striking growth in participation, however, has been in the category of nominally inclusive performances and ceremonies. This category of ceremony includes the Afrikaans music and culture festivals that have sprung up since the mid-1990s across South Africa, as well as the experience of the spectator in a sports stadium. Although framed as events that are inclusive, or based on associative identities, such gatherings are, *de facto* quite homogenous spaces. The final category, truly inclusive ceremonies, examines the new holidays that have been recognized by the government. The argument of this chapter, in sum, is that although strictly-defined ethno-linguistically homogenous spaces are common in the new South Africa, in general, those events that have the largest pool of supporters are those that are nominally inclusive and based on identities framed as affiliations. These spaces are not more integrated in practice, but are framed as potentially more inclusive. Drawing from ethnographic observations and field notes, as well as interview data, this chapter attempts to give the reader both a sense of the ways in which performances are enacted, as well as allowing interview participants to give their opinions.

 Chapter Six addresses the ways that the politics of place and space are playing out in the post-apartheid state. Emerging from decades of segregation and control over space in the colonial and apartheid regimes, many places are still characterized by profound separateness in South Africa. The chapter argues that, in important ways, many spaces are still unshared in South Africa, twenty years into democracy. Looking at both public and private space, this chapter delves into the idea of space, land, and ownership as being central to the communal imagination of both Zulu and Afrikaans Speakers. The public spaces examined in this chapter—neighborhoods and monumental architecture—demonstrate a remarkable degree of change in the democratic era. Newly integrated neighborhoods, and newly erected statues point to meaningful change in the landscape of democratic versus apartheid South Africa. Private spaces, like individual homes and patterns of land ownership, are less transformed and often deadlocked by communities’ perception of space and ownership as constitutive of belonging. In the case of land ownership, threats of land reform are often seen as indicative of a broader kind of hostility against Afrikaner farmers by the government. For Zulu-speakers, by contrast, the lack of movement on land reform signals an unwillingness on the part of the government to engage in meaningful economic reform. The final section of the chapter, which addresses the national territory of South Africa and its contestation through separatist “cultural” communities of Afrikaners, demonstrates how the contestation over space is also a dispute over the symbolic boundaries of the nation.

 The connections between language and identity are the subject of Chapter Seven. It discusses the ways that interview participants spoke about language, and used language identity as a proxy for both race and ethnicity in their own speech. In addition, language has, according to some participants, come to serve a role as a socially acceptable mode of segregation, especially in Bloemfontein and at the University of the Free State. This chapter also considers a case study of newspaper coverage of a key event from my fieldwork in South Africa—the violence at the mines in Marikana—and analyzes the ways in which different language media covered the event. This event, which constituted the largest and most deadly use of police force against civilians in the post-apartheid era, left 34 miners dead and more than 200 wounded. The accounts that emerge in the coverage of the violence immediately afterward vary significantly between isiZulu and Afrikaans newspapers.

The chapter concludes that, although language cleavages correspond with other kinds of divisions, like class, race and location, they represent a peculiar and iterated kind of division within South Africa. The fact that, for example, different language reading publics in South Africa were presented with such vastly different interpretations of the Marikana narrative, or different language classes at the University of the Free State or the University of Pretoria present such distinct educational opportunities, the everyday affiliations of language reproduce and subtly widen gaps by introducing new vocabularies to talk about events and distinct spaces within a community.

 The final empirical chapter, Chapter 8, deals with the ways that democratic contestation in South Africa serves to flag difference or build national coalitions. Contestation, which is critical to the practice of democracy, is examined through the lenses of party politics, as well as extra-institutional forms of dissent, like exit. Stemming from a rich literature on race and vote choice in South Africa, these sections of the chapter take on the ways in which voters expressed party preference, and how their decision to support or oppose given parties is linked to their identity politics. Additionally, in the last decade or so, the efforts of the ANC to undermine opposition have manifested themselves in a particular language with which to speak about democracy and opposition, which has filtered out in many ways to their constituents.

 The final section of the chapter deals with the ways that exit forms an important repertoire of opposition in South Africa. In the first half of the section, civil society organizations directly involved with politics are the basis of inquiry, because so many of them reject the labeling of their activities as “political.” The widespread characterization of politics as a dirty, negative or degrading activity seems to indicate a rejection of democratic contestation as a method of resolving problems. This exit from “politics,” while engaging in political activities, is often accompanied by a condemnation of electoral democracy as insufficient, ineffective or troublesome. The other form of exit that is examined in this section is the phenomenon of emigration from among the community of Afrikaans-speakers. Since 1994, a significant percentage of white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans have left the country. While not necessarily an outright rejection of multi-racial democracy, this phenomenon poses an interesting opportunity through which to examine Afrikaans-speakers’ understandings of the future of South Africa, and their place within a multi-racial community.

The concluding chapter serves to wrap up the analysis presented in the empirical chapters of this project. Also included are suggestions for further research, the policy implications of this study in terms of institutionalist approaches to the study and practice of nation building and some very basic projections about the future consolidation of South African democracy.

1. Zulu Nationalist public figures and historians, including King Goodwill Zwelithini, hotly contest this version of the history. At the commemoration of the Reconciliation Bridge across the Ncome River (discussed below), the king said “It’s not true that the river turned into blood. If we keep saying that our children will spit on our graves” (Dzanibe 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Malan said of South Africa, “there’s no such thing as a true story here. The facts might be correct, but the truth they embody is always a lie to someone else. My truths strike some people as racist heresies. Nadine Gordimer’s strike me as distortions calculated to appeal to gormless liberals on the far side of the planet. A lot of South Africans can’t read either of us, so their truth is something else entirely. Atop all this, we live in a country where mutually annihilating truths coexist entirely amicably” (Malan 2009, 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A parliamentary committee heard testimony about the closures in 2016, and representatives from both the Voortrekker Monument and the Bloedrivier museum cited the fact that the Department of Arts and Culture could not transfer funds regularly to their institutions because neither is a Declared Cultural Institution as a primary reason for their budgetary constraints. Both institutions are funded in large part by private donations, rather than government funding. Both Freedom Park and the Ncome River Museum are Declared Cultural Institutions, and therefore receive the majority of their operating budgets from governmental funds. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The strategy of creating new monuments and museums in spaces that had previously been occupied by Afrikaner nationalist and colonial monuments was a key move in the transition, because of the idea that such new monuments would complicate the memorialization of white nationalist figures, and promote representation of the majority population. But this strategy also assumed that there would be a connection between and conversation about the new monuments and the old monuments occupying the same space. The #RhodesMustFall movement called into question this “multiplicative logic” of the transition period because, the student activists argued, the contextualization of monuments to majority rule was an insufficient and unsuccessful attempt to transform public spaces and university campuses (Holmes and Loehwing 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. These polite fictions about the organic development of the state from demands by self-defined communities are possible in the context of early forming states in the developed world (see, e.g. Weber 1976). However, in much of the post-colonial world, the imposition of authority pre-dates any articulation of nationalism because of the experience of colonialism and the external definition of borders. This order of events is especially true on the African continent, where colonial imposition of borders was at its farthest remove from the realities on the ground. Yet, with the anti-colonial movements of the mid-20th century, articulations of nationalism grounded many resistance efforts at least among elites. Although a more complex relationship to the idea of self-determination, nationalist movements on the continent did self-consciously articulate the idea of self-determination and the illegitimacy of outside rule as key components of the anti-colonial struggle. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The transition itself was not completely peaceful. Much of the violence of the transition was geographically concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng and fought along partisan and ethno-linguistic lines (Donham and Mofokeng 2011; Taylor 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Primordialism has lost much of its sway as an independent theory of nationalism, because it largely lacks evidentiary support. As such, it has been roundly dismissed by prominent scholars of nationalism (see, e.g. Brubaker 1996; Chandra 2006; Wimmer 2013). Even if the primordial tradition is not independently influential, it represents an important element in the combined repertoire of nationalist thinking (Coakley *Forthcoming*). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This view, according to Gibson, is held by just over 50% of whites (and 62.7% of Afrikaans-speaking whites), and approximately 33% of Coloureds, Indians and Black South Africans. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Grant funding through the Fulbright program, where I originally applied for research funds—though the grant was later funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation after the defunding of Fulbright programs by the federal government in 2011—was unavailable for projects primarily concentrated in the Cape. The region was already considered “well-studied.” [↑](#footnote-ref-9)